European Union

National Interest vs the Common Good in the EU

In an article in the European Journal of Political Research, Petya Alexandrova and Arco Timmermans review the role of the rotating country Presidency (until 2010) for the agenda of the European Council. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.

Petya Alexandrova and Arco Timmermans. (2013). National Interest versus the Common Good: The Presidency in European Council Agenda Setting. European Journal of Political Research 52 (3): 316-338.